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Unemployment has increased dramatically with stabilization,
mainly because of a generalized co;ttraction in output, rather
than a sectoral restructuring or a massive shedding of labor. Real
wages fell sharply, and the wage policy has become a delicate
political issue. One prescription for reducing the drawbacks in
current wage policy is to replace that policy with a generalized
agreement on  the  wage  path, with  synchronized six-month
contracts. Such an agreement might be seen as a consensual
agreement  - a "social  pact"  - rather  than as a punitive  tax.
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Coricelli and Revenga teview recent develop-  from March on, wages increased faster than
ments in wages, employment, and unemploy-  prices, probably contributing to the persistence
ment in Poland and discuss some of the main  of inflation.
risks Poland faces in sustaining its stabilization
effort. They find that:  The wage policy still in force in Poland at
the end of 1991 maintains a few undesirable
Unemployment has increased dramatically  features. The monthly indexation and the possi-
with stabilization, but this increase cannot be  bility of carrying forward the unused margins are
said to reflect widespread economic adjustment  among the policy's  main drawbacks; another is
and restructuring throughout the Polish  the link between wages and profitability.
economy. Contrary to predictions made prior to
the January 1990 program, employment has  The current wage policy could be replaced
declined nearly uniformnly  across all sectors,  by a generalized agreement on the wage path,
mainly as a result of a generalized contraction in  with synchronized six-month contracts. The
output, rather than as a result of sectoral restruc-  wage path should be related to expected inflation
turing or massive shedding of labor.  and economywide productivity. This scheme
would also have the advantage of being based on
Wages showed a significant degree of  a consensual agreement - a "social pact" -
downward flexibility - in real terns  - at the  instead of being perceived as being imposed as a
beginning of the year, when firrns faced a severe  punitive tax.
supply shock coupled with very tight credit. But
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I.  Introduction
1.  In  January  1990,  the  Polish  government  implemented  an  extrenmely  ambitious
economic  reform  program  aimed  at  the  rapid  creation  of  a  market  economy.  The
program  combined  a  sharp  "heterodox"  stabilization  effort,  based  on  the  use  of
two  nominal  anchors  to  break  the  inflationary  momentum,  with  radical
liberalization  of  domsstic  and  foreign  trade.  Overall,  the  program  proved  itself
quite  successful  in  halting  hyperinflation,  although  inflation  nevertheless
remained  higher  than  expected.  However,  the  reform  effort  also  produced  some
unanticipated  side-effects:  most  importantly,  a  sharp  contraction  in  output  and
a  larger-than-anticipated  increase  in  unemployment  --  from  a  practically
nonexistent  level  in  1989  to  1.126  million  workers  by  et.d-1990.1  As  projected,
the  stabilization  program  also  resulted  in  a  sharp  decline  in  real  wages. 2
2.  As  the  above  discussion  suggests,  the  first  18  months  following  the  Polish
stabilization  program  offer  an  extremely  interesting  opportunity  to  study  the
reaction  of  labor  market  variables,  namely  wages  and  employment,  to  a  "Big-Bang"
style  reform  program.  What  we  may  learn  from  this  exercise  is  of  particular
relevance  not  only  to  Poland,  but  also  to  other  Eastern  European  countries
implementing  market-oriented  economic  reforms  within  a  broadly  unchanged
ownership  and  control  structure  of  enterprises.
This  represented  6.1%  of the Polish labor force. By June 1991,  the unemploymentrate  had increased  to 8.4%.
2  For the year as a whole, this drop was in line with the government  program.  Note that for both unemployment  and wages the
available  information  is very partial, as it does not fully  capture  developments  in the private  sector. Moreover,  issues  of interpretation  of the
figures  arise due to the  structural  change  which  took place  in 1990. For instance,  real wages  in 1990  are hardly  comparable  with those  in 1989,
as in 1990  prices  were liberalized  and ihortages  were largely  eliminated. As regards  unemployment,  difficulties  arise  because  of the well known
presence  of 'disguised  unemployment'  (or overmanning)  before 1990.2
3.  With this in  mind, in  this no';e  we review developments in the Polish labor
market after the stabilization program of January 1990, and discuss some of the
main  risks  Poland faces in sustaining the  stabilization effort.  We  try to
highlight some of the main policy issues that are relevant at this juncture and
also raise some analytical questions which the Polish experience suggests.
4.  Among the main "stylized" facts, the following stand out:
(i)  For 1990  as a whole, real  wages showed a high degree of downward
flexibility, declining by more than 30 percent.  This seems prima
fac_e  to  contradict  the  view  of  absence  o.  wage  restraints  in
worker-controlled  state-enterprises.  Obviously  one  explanation
could be the presence of a tax-based wage policy.
(ii)  Despite the figures for the year as a whole, wage policy was
apparently not binding, as in the first months of 1990 wages were
well below the maximum permitted while in the second half of the
year  they  --e above the norm.  Moreover, the drop of real wages was
entirely  -. to tl.e  decline in the first two months of 1990.  Since
March wages  increased consistently above the  rate of  inflation.
This,  in  turn,  could  have  contributed  to  the  persistence  in
inflation  during  1990.  In the  first  half of  1991, real  wages
displayed  a  new  decline,  as  enterprise  conditions  deteriorated
sharply  in response to  the  demise  of  the CMEA  trade,  the  real
appreciation of the exchange rate and a further tightening of credit
policy.3
(iii)  Employment dropped significantly in the socialized sector,
but  by  substantially  less  than  production,  suggesting  the
persistence  of  labor-hoarding  and  contradicting  a  priori
expectations of massive release of redundant labor. 3
(iv)  As  bankruptcies  and  restructuring  did  not  occur  in  any
significant  scale, most  of the unemployment  created during  1990
seems to be related to an aggregate shock to the economy and not to
frictions in the reallocation of resources across  sectors.  The
sluggish adjustment of employment  is confirmed in 1991, when the
lagged effects of the 1990  output decline have determined a decline
in employment in relation to 1991 decline in  output larger  than the
one observed in 1990 (the  short-run  employment-output elasticity has
thus increased in 1991).
5.  Our study of the Polish experience raises some concerns relating to future
short-term developments  in the labor market.  Two are worth noting:  (a) the
potentially undesirable consequences of the existing  wage policy; and (b)
a costly further increase in unemployment.  As regards  wage policy, we find tnat
the scheme adopted for 1991 has intLoduced a degree of inertia in the system,
thus proving to be a  serious obstacle for  the reduction of the rate  of inflation.
As regards unemployment, we estimate that the mere effects of the 1990  recession
could lead to about  2  million unemployed by  end-1991.  The additional contraction
in output now projected for 1991  will raise unemployment even further in the
3  This pauern has changed  in 1991,  with employment  decline  matching  the further  contmaction  of output.4
following year. 4
6.  The Polish experience suggests that in  the short-term,  until incentives at
the enterprise level have been  substantially altered, the government  has to
maincain some control over  wage policy.  However, such  wage controls neceasarily
impose some distortions, so they should be kept as simple and as temporary as
possible.  The maintenance of steeply progressive penalty rates on excess wage
increases is also proving in 1991 to be potentially damaging for the process of
"decapitalization" of enterprises.  Indeed, it seems that firms are willing to
sell assets in order to pay wages and then sell additional assets to pay the
excess wage tax.
7.  The note is structured as follows.  Section II reviews the "Big-Bang"
reform program and its major outcomes.  Section III present_ some background on
the Polish labor  market, discusses the main labor  market developments in 1990  at
both the  aggregate and  sectoral levels, and presents  some trends  for 1991.
Section IV evaluates the wage policy approved by the Government, and considers
the prospects for unemployment and wages in  the second half of 1991.  Section V
contains  some  concluding  remarks  and  outlines  some  directions  for  further
analysis of labor  market developments  during the transition to a market-oriented
economy.  Annex I contains the statistical information.
4  Given  the pervasiveness  of labor hoarding  by Polish  firns prior to the 1990  reforms  (estimate.s  suggest  'disguised  unemployment'
represented  20% of the labor force prior to 1990),  we could  expect  a regime  shift which  led to the massive  release  of redundant  labor (such  as
a change  in the ownership  and control structure  of enterprises),  to raise unemployment  dramnatically.5
II. Background On Macroeconomic Developments After The "big-Bang"
8.  The stabilization  program launched in  January 1990  relied on  the use  of two
nominal anchiors,  namely the exchange rate with respect to the US $ and the level
of nominal wages, to achieve a fast reduction in the rate of inflation with a
smaller  contraction  in  output  than  the  one  which  would  have  occurred  by
implementing  a  pure  "orthodox"  program  of  monetary  and  fiscal  tightening.
Despite  these  objectives,  inflation  proved  to  be  more  persistent  than
anticipated, while the contraction of output and the increase in unemployment
turned out to be much larger. Against this background, it is useful to analyze
briefly  whether wages  behaved consistently  with their role  of  nominal anchor, and
to explore whether the behavior of employment and unemployment can shed some
light on the performance of the stabilization program.
(i)  Nominal variables after stabilization
9.  Chart 1 summarizes the behavior of the main nominal variables --  the CPI,
the aggregate wage and  the exchange  rate --  before and  after the launching  of  the
stabilization program.  As is known,  the key goal  of stabilizatian programs with
nominal  anchors is to achieve  a synchronized movement of nominal variables,
namely  a  convergence  in the movement  of prices,  wages  and  exchange  rates.
Indeed, asynchronization will determine changes in real variables --  the real
wage  and the  real exchange rate --  which  can jeopardize the  success of the
stabilization program.  It is important to stress that the program aimed at a
sharp  divergence  on  impact  to  achieve  a  sudden  reduction  in  real  wages
(considered  excessive at end-1989) and a sharp devaluation of the exchange rate,6
Chart 1.  Prices, Wages,  Exchange  Rate
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meant to also compensate for the sudden reduction of trade protection.  The
conver;ence should have thus occurred immediately after this tnitial  adjustment
of the levels of the various nominal variables.
10.  Actual developments show  that indeed the initial discrepancy was followed
by  some apparent  convergence.  However, from March  onwards, wages  increased
fadter than prices and despite the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate, prices
increased at average monthly rates of about 4-5 percent throughout the year.
Thus, inflation remained surprisingly persistent.  This raises some questions
regarding the stabilization effort: Did the program hit a "floor" for inflation
(as  has occurred in  other stabilization programs)?  Was  this floor  related to  the
initial adjustment or overadjustment of the exchange rate? Or was  it due to
inertial factors driven by the behavior of wages and/or the staggering of price
changes across  firms and sectors?  These general issues have been discussed
elsewhere  (Coricelli, de la Calle and Pinto  (1990)).  Thus,  in this note we
concentrate almost exclusively on the role played by wages and the wage policy.
Our main conclusion, as argued in more detail in Section III.2, is that wage
behavior, and in particular the wage policy adopted in 1990, most  likely did
contribute to the persistence of inflation.
11.  Overall, it seems that although both wage and exchange rate targets wee
fully met for the year as a whole, within the year the two nominal anchors did
not actually operate.  The other components of the package, namely monetary and
fiscal  policy seem  to have been  much more restrictive  than anticipatf-d.  Ex  post,
the program appears to have led to results more similar to those typical of
"orthodox" rather than "heterodox" programs.8
(ii)  Real variables: outtPut  and employment
12.  Given that the "sharp" stabiltzation progran.  was implemented along with
other important  reforms (such  as  trade reform), it  is  hard to isolate  the factors
behind the decline in output and employment.  It seems that an aggregate shock
(related to  m, etary  and fiscal policy) dominated  sectoral shocks.  In the
aggregate, production fell by about 25 percent in the socialized sector, while
employment fell  by about 11 percent.  All the sectors of the economy registered
a drop in  output.  Obviously the response  of the various sectors  differed, as to
be expected given their different initial conditions.  Moreover, the opening of
the economy might have affected the various sectors with different intensity.
In  particular, light industry,  which registered the sharpest fall in  outpu_ (-35
percent), might have been exposed to "effective" foreign  competition faster  than
the other sectors  as the time  to create  effective channels  of imports  and exports
is usually shorter for sectors producing final consumer goods.  In addition to
trade reform, sectors  might have  also been  affected differently  by the  tightening
of credit. 5
III.  Labor Market Developments in 1990 and early 1991
A.  Structural and Institutional Background
13.  Prior  to the start  of  the  Economic Transformation Program (ETP),  the Polish
labor market  followed the typical centrally planned economy model,  in which
pervasive s_ate-intervention severely limited the traditional forms of market
S  First, not all the sectors  are characterized  by the  same 'credit-intensity'  for their operations. Vertical  integration  of production
processes  and the time span of the product' i period  varv significantly  across sectors.  Second,  on the liquidity  side, firms  which  had significant
stocks of both inventories  and foreign  cut  icy deposi- were able to substitute  credit with internal funds  generated  by capital  gains on dollar
deposits  and inventories  of goods.9
adjustment.  Extensive regulations delinked wages from productivity, while  a
po:  .cy  of subsidizing full-employmtent  translated into  widespread labor hoarding
and v  persistent shortage  of labor. The introduction  of the  ETP in  January 1990.
however,  greatly  altered  the  rules  of  the  game:  no  longer  committed  to
maintaining fi.li-employment  at all costs, the government intre.  Iced  a greater
degree of financial  discipline into  the socialized  sector  via  credit restrictions
and  fiscal austerity measures,  and passed  legislation allowing  for massive
layoffs  of  workers.  One  consequence  was  a  significant  increase  in  open
unemployment.
14.  The  ETP  comprised  some  important  changes  in  wage  and  employment
legislation.  In some areae, however, the old regulations are still applicable.
At present,  industrial relations and wace  settina are both governed by laws
drafted during the previous regime.  However, amendments to  the existing law are
under preparation, and a completely new labor code is expected to be in place
within two years.  As regards mass layoffs, new legislation was passed in 1989
establishing procedures for group redundancies.  The law requires 30-90 days
advance notice and up to 90 days severance payments for layc;  fs involving 10% or
more of employees.  F"ew  social safety net mechanisms (unemployment  benefits and
social assistance) have also been introduced within the last year. 6
6  An individual  is  entitled  to unemployment  benefits  if he/she  has been  employed  or self-employed  for at least  6 months  in the previous
year.  However,  there are numerous  exceptions  under which  these conditions  do not apply: for example,  the eligibility  restrictions  are waived
for individuals  who become  unemployed  through  a mass layoff,  are school leavers  or under 18, or sole breadwinners.  Benefit  levels  are  tied
to past earnings  with a declining  replacement  rate. The minimum  benefit  is 9S%  of the  tinimum wage  (def.ned  as35 % of the projected  average
wage).  At present, duration is not limited, but an amendment  under consideration  would limit the maximum  duration  of unemployment
compensation  to I year. In terms  of social  welfare,  assistance  is aimed at those  who do not qualify for Ul.10
15.  The Structure of Emplovment:  The socialized sector accounts for 70% of
total employment in  Poland, with most of the remaining 30% heavily concentrated
in  agriculture.  In 1989,  non-agricultural private sector  employment represented
only about 8.8% of total employment.  Throughout  the 1980s, the distribttion of
employment between agriculture, indlistry  and services has remained fair stable.
This  distribution, as  well as  the breakdown  between private and  socialized sector
employment, should change dramatically in the next few years.
B.  Employment Developments in 1990 and early 1991
16.  Registered unemployment has increased steadily since early 1990, rising
from  55,800 workers  in January  to  1,126,000 workers  by  December  1990, and
i.lcreasing  to 1,574,000  workers by June 1991 (see  Chart 2).  At the beginning of
1990, the number of unemployment rate represented a  mere 0.3% of the total labor
force.  By year's end, this proportion had increased to 6.1%, and by June 1991,
it  reached 8.4%.  As Table 1  shows,  the largest  absolute increases  in unemployment
occurred in the second and third quarters of 1990, with unemployment rising by
approximately 120,000  to 130,000  workers per  month during June, July  and August. 7
The rate  of growth of  unemployment  declined slightly in  the fourth  quarter,  then
picked  up slightly in the first and  second quarters of  1991.(An interesting
analysis  of the dynamics of  Polish unemployment in  1990-91 is in  Gora and  Lehmann
(1991)).
17.  At a first  glance, the  sharp rise in  unemployment could  be taken to reflect
widespread employment adjustment and restructuring throughout the socialized
7 This could  reflect  an increase  in school  leavers entering  the labc- force during  the sumrner  months,  however  the data for 1990  seem
to guggest  that this occurs later in the year,  mainly  during the fall. (See  Table 1)11
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sector.  However, further analysis of the patterns of flows into unemployment
suggests that this is not necessarily the case.  Despite tightened financial
discipline and a sharp drop in production, firms have not cut employment by as
much as could have been expected, particularly given widespread perceptions of
overmanning in Polish industry.  Employment in the total socialized sector fell
by 11%  between December 1989  and  December 1990,  while  total socialized production
fell  by 25%.  Similarly, employment in socialized industry fell  by approximately
14% in  response to  a 24% decline in  socialized industrial  production.  Output per
worker actually declined.
18.  This observation runs counter to the expectation that firms would release
redundant labor  in  response to newly-imposed  financial  discipline.  Rather,  the
evidence suggests that the decline in employment was driven primarily by the
sharp fall in production at the beginning of the year, and that, furthermore,
employment adjustment  is extremely gradual and sluggish.  This  is presented
graphically in  Chart 3.  Based on  the observed behavior for 1990,  there is little
evidence suggesting a true regime shift as regards employment adjustment and
behavior.  However, the fact that adjustment is sluggish would imply that much
of the employment response  to the fall in  production in 1990  would take place in
1991.  The  data  for the  first half  of  1991  indicate  a  continued  fall  in
employment, but also a parallel decline in output, which in turn is likely to
imply further declines in employment in the near future.
19.  Table 1 shows  that month-to-month declines in  employment in  the socialized
sector were consistently smaller than the monthly increase in unemployment for
every month except January, May and December 1990, and April 1991.  This would13
Chart  3: Poland
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REGISTERED  UNEMPLOYMENT,  I-XII  1990
JAN  FEB  MAR  APR  MAY  JUN  JUL  AIJG  SEP  OCT  NOV  DEC
TOTAL UNE.PLOYMENT(OOOS)  55.8  152.2  266.6  351.1  443.2  568.2  699.3  _20.3  926.4  1.008.4  1.089.1  1,126.1
CHANGE  COOOs)  46.1  96.4  114.4  84.5  92.1  125.0  131.1  121.0  106.1  82.0  80.7  37.0
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATES
AS  % OF  LABOR  FORCE  0.3  0.8  1.5  1.9  2.4  3.1  3.8  4.5  5.0  5.5  5.9  6.1
AS  % OF  NON-AGR  LF  0.4  1.1  2.0  2.6  3.3  4.2  5.2  6.1  6.9  7.5  8.1  8.3
MASS  LAYOFFS
cOOOs)  2.4  6.8  15.2  27.4  42.1  58.0  79.0  100.9  126.0  147.2  165.5  183.6
% OF  UNEMPLOYMENT  4.3  4.5  5.7  7.8  9.5  10.2  11.3  12.3  13.6  14.6  15.2  16.3
CHANGE  (000s)  4.4  8.3  12.2  14.7  15.9  21.1  21.9  25.1  21.2  18.3  18.0
% OF  MONTHLY  INCREASE  IN
UNEMPLOYMENT  4.6  7.3  14.4  16.0  12.7  16.1  18.1  23.7  25.9  22.7  48.7
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  SOCIAL  7,226.0  7,176.0  7,107.0  7,063.0  6,949.0  6,888.0  6,800.0  6,711.0  6,643.0  6,584.0  6,515.0  6,348.0
CHANGE  (000s)  (78.9)  (50.0)  (69.0)  (44.0)  (114.0)  (61.0)  (88.0)  (89.0)  (68.0)  (59.0)  (69.0)  (167.0)
% OF INCREASE  IN UNEMPLOY  171.1  51.9  60.3  52.1  123.8  48.8  67.1  73.6  64.1  72.0  85.5  451.4
EMPLOYMENT  INDUSTRY  3,979.0  3,964.0  3.938.0  3,947.0  3,889.0  3,870.0  3,840.0  3,803.0  3,781.0  3,763.0  3,737.0  3,632.0  41
CHANGE  (OOOs)  (39.0)  (15.0)  (26.0)  9.0  (58.0)  (19.0)  (30.0)  (37.0)  (22.0)  (18.0)  (26.0)  (105.0)
% OF  INCREASE  IN UNEMPLOY  84.6  15.6  22.7  10.7  63.0  15.2  22.9  30.6  20.7  22.0  32.2  283.8
SCHOOL  LEAVERS  (000s)  124.2  157.0  164.9  164.8  164.3
VACANCIES  IN  THOUS.  35.2  20.1  24.1  31.7  37.8  42.5  47.7  57.3  61.0  63.9  56.1  54.1
CHANGE  IN  THOUS.  (219.4)  (15.1)  4.0  7.6  6.1  4.7  5.2  9.6  3.7  2.9  (7.8)  (2.0)
UNEMPLOYED  PE'. VACANCY  2  8  11  11  12  13  15  14  15  16  19  21
-MEN  1  6  8  8  8  9  9  9  10  10  13  14
- WOMEN  3  14  24  23  23  30  36  33  37  37  41  40
Source:  GUS,  Blulelyn  StalystycznyREGISTERED  UNEMPLOYMENT.  I-VI 1991
JANUARY  FEBRUARY  MARCH  APRIL  MAY  JUNE
TOTAL  UNEMPLOYMENT  'OOOs)  1,196  1,259  1,322  1,370  1,435  1,574
CHANGE  C000s)  a)  69.6  63.2  63.2  48.0  64.4  139.6
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATES b)
AS  % OF  LABOR  FORCE  6.5  6.8  7.1  7.3  7.7  8.4
MASS  LAYOFFS
(OOOs)  218.8  237.9  249.9  268.5  285.5  314.8
% OF UNEMPLOYMENT  18.3  18.9  18.9  19.6  19.9  20.0
CHANGE('000s) a)  35.3  19.1  11.9  18.7  16.9  29.4
% OF MONTHLY  INCREASE  IN
UNEMPLOYMENT  50.7  30.3  18.9  38.9  26.3  21.0
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  SOCIAL('000s  6,382.0  6,347.0  6,365.0  6,290.0  6,217.0  6,185.0
CHANGE  ('OOOs)  a)  34.0  (35.0)  18.0  (75.0)  (73.0)  (32.0)
% OF INCREASE  IN UNEMPLOYM  (48.9)  55.4  (28.5)  156.3  113.4  22.9
EMPLOYMENT  INDUSTRY  ('000s)  c)  3665.0  3649.0  3658.0  3617.0  3575.0  3554.0
CHANGE  ('000s) a)  33.0  (16.0)  9.0  (41.0)  (42.0)  (21.0)
% OF INCREASE  IN UNEMPLOYM  (47.4)  25.3  (14.2)  85.4  65.2  15.0
VACANCIES  IN  THOUS.  45.3  42.2  45.8  49.9  47.0  47.4
CHANGE  IN THOUS.  (8.8)  (3.1)  3.6  4.1  (2.9)  0.4
UNEMPLOYED  PER  VACANCY  26  30  29  27  31  33
-MEN  18  20  19  18  19  21
- WOMEN  46  46  56  57  66  74
source:  GUS,  Bluletyn  Statystyczny16
appear to  fit with  the argument that a substantial part of unemployment  is
comprised of new entrants.  However, the table also shows that unemployment
increases one month track employment declines from the previous month fairly
accurately --ie. there appears to be a lag in the process of registering as
unemployed.  The pattern  of unemployment flows for  the  month of  December reflects
this "lagged" unemployment response most clearly.  In December, the drop  in
employment in  the socialized  sector far  exceeded the increase in  unemployment (by
about 130,000 jobs).  In January 1991, the number of unemployed subsequently
increased by 70,000 workers, twice the decline in employment for that month.
Thus,  much  of  the  sharp  rise  in unemployment  appeared  to  reflect  "true"
employment decline, casting some  doubt  on the  popular perception that  many of  the
unemployed are new entrants attracted by generous unemployment benefits. 8
20.  The share of mass layoffs to total unemployment has increased over time:
in January 1990, mass layoffs represented 4.3% of total unemployment; by June
1991, this share had increased  to 20%.9 Nevertheless, the share of mass layoffs
in total unemployment remains fairly low,  which is consistent with the apparent
lack of bankruptcies in the socialized sector.
21.  Vacancies dropped  sharply during the first quarter of 1990, then rose
through the second and third quarters, reaching a high of 64,000 in October.
8  This increase in labor supply could  be associated  with: (a) an income  effect - as real income  and employment  fall, labor force
patlicipation  of secondary labor force members  would tend to increase;  (b) a related income  effect associated  with the end of the shortage
economy- the increased  availability  of goods to be purchased  with  household  incomes  could  also induce  secondary  labor force members  to enter
the labor force;  and (c) more generous  unemployment  bencfits,  which could  cause  discouraged  or non-active  workers  to re-enter  the labor force
and register  as unemployed.
9  Of course, without  individual  data it is impossible  to know  who flows  in and out of unemployment,  and therefore  it is impossible
to know  how the composition  of the stock  of unemployed  changes  over time.  However,  to the extent that mass layoffs  seem to be accounting
for a larger share of the flow into unemployment,  it seems  reasonable  to assume that they will end up constituting  a larger share of the stock
of the unemployed.17
November and December, the number of vacancies fell moderately, ending the year
at 53,400.  Throughout the first half of 1991, the number of vacancies remained
fairly  stable,  hovering  between  45,000  and  50,000 openings.  The  fact  that
vacancies have not decreased as  unemployment has gone up suggests some  degree of
mismatch between  the demand and supply  of labor. Or alternatively it  may reflect
the existence of rigidities in the labor market that prevent workers from  being
fully mobile.
22.  The existence of such rigidities may help explain the apparent dispersion
in  unemployment rates across regions.  Regional unemployment rates range from a
low of 2.1% in Warsaw to a high of 11.5% in Suwalskie (see Table 2).  There is
even larger variation in  vacancy rates, with some rural areas showing a very low
number of vacancies per person unemployed, and other areas --  such as Warsaw --
showing a large number of vacancies.  This observation indicates that inter-
regional labor  mobility is  quite low,  and  that  mismatch between supply and  dem~-d
for labor across regions is likely to be important.  However, there appears to
be a  strong  negative correlation  across regions  between  the  regional  unemployment
rate and the regional ratio of vacancies to unemployed, suggesting that within
regions demand and supply are better matched.
23.  The Private Sector: The above picture is necessarily partial in that it
excludes developments in  the private sector.  Unfortunately, "hard" statistical
data on wage and  employment developments in  the private sector  are  not available.
The existing information suggests that, in contrast to what was observed in the
socialized sector, employment growth in the non-agricultural private sector  was
strong  throughout 1990.  The authorities estimate  the increase in  private sector18
TABLE2
UNEMPLOYMENT  BY REGION
WOJEWODzTWO fSHAREOFTOTq  PRIV_SECTOR I  UNEMPLOYME  UERATE  VACANCIES  |UNEMPLOYED PER
EMP-IUI  %_OFTOTALU89  DOe-0  1  Dec-40  Do0o  1  VACANCY
Poland a)  100.0  29.6  1126.1  6.1  53400  21
Warszawekie  6.6  26.3  26.9  2.1  12l4l  2
Bbalskopodbaskie  0.9  53.1  9.3  e.0  54  172
Bbalostockib  1.9  42.s  29.2  8.5  1044  28
Bblaikh  2.4  34.6  17.5  4.1  1147  1r
Bydogoskie  2.7  26.8  39.5  7.8  1577  25
Chelmskle  0.7  46.4  7.0  6.4  296  27
Clbchanowskie  1.1  51.7  19.5  9.8  301  a5
Czatochowukie  2.0  39.1  21.5  5..  540  40
Eibbasikb  1.1  26.7  17.3  9,  "I  is
Gdangkii  3.3  23.8  31.6  1246  25
Gorzowskis  1.2  27.4  21.2  9.2  804  26
JoIeniogorskIi  1.3  24.0  24.4  9.9  424  58
Kaliskie  1.9  38.2  25.7  75  823  31
Katowickie  10.1  15.3  63.4  3.4  7800  8
Kbeleckie  3.3  42.0  38.4  6.7  768  51
Koninskie  1.2  44.1  20.e  9.2  463  44
Koezalinekie  1.3  25.5  23.0  9.5  494  47
Krakowskie  3.3  30.7  21.1  3.4  3715  6
Krosnihnskie  1.4  41.2  18.9  7.3  139  13e
Legnickib  1.3  21.8  19.2  8.0  19  as
Lsezczynskie  1.0  35.4  9.4  6.5  397  24
Lubeiskie  2.8  39.7  32.4  6.4  442  73
lomnzynWkie  1.0  60.9  16.4  9.4  144  114
lodzkie  3.0  24.3  47.6  8.5  2957  1s
Nowosadeckbe  2.0  50.7  20.8  5.8  344  6o
Olsztynskie  1.8  25.7  34.9  10.2  483  72
Opolskie  2.6  26.2  19.2  3.9  880  22
Ostoleckis  1.1  53.9  15.5  8.3  139  112
Pilsie  1.2  29.1  16.2  7.7  313  52
Piotrkowskib  1.8  41.1  27.3  8.6  830  33
Plockie  1.4  43.5  22.9  8.9  228  100
Poznanskie  3.4  28.2  21.2  3.5  1324  16
Przemyskie  1.1  48.2  17.4  8.5  136  128
Radomskie  2.1  48.9  23.1  6.1  2593  9
Rz2ezowskie  2.0  39.1  25.7  6.9  248  104
Siedleckie  1.8  58.5  15.6  5.0  255  e1
Sieradzkie  1.2  50.5  14  6.7  11i  126
Slupskie  1.1  50.5  13.4  6.8  396  34
Skierniewckie  1.0  27.7  16.8  9.0  847  20
Suwalskie  1.i  37.6  25.1  1  .5  272  92
Szczencinskie  2.4  20.2  20.9  4.6  1256  17
Tarnobrzoekie  1.8  48.7  19.7  6.1  747  26
Tarnowskie  1.8  47.6  18.1  5.4  196  02
Torunskie  1.6  31.5  28.1  9.3  354  79
Walbrzyskie  1.8  20.6  28.0  8.2  414  as
Wloclawskie  1.1  44.2  15.8  7.9  304  52
Wroclawskie  2.8  22.8  23.5  4.4  1855  13
Zamojskie  1.5  58.3  15.2  5.8  75  203
Zielonogorskie  1.6  25.9  24.3  8.0  648  38
a) Total  employment  was 17.558.000  in 198919
employment for 1990  at 400,000 jobs.  In  the first  half of 1991 employment in the
private sector declined by about 200,000  units, and it is estimated that at end-
June 1991 3,963,000  people (or  33.2  percent  of  total non-agricultural  employment)
are  employed  in  the  private  sector  outside  agriculture.  The  decline  in
employment in  the  private sector,  however, is  mainly due to  the inclusion in 1991
of cooperatives  and foundations, many of which are  in the process  of being
dissolved,  in  the private  sector.  In the material  sphere, which  excludes
cooperatives and foundations, private sector employment grew by 1.1 percent in
the first half of 1991, compared with a decline of 7.7 percent in the public
sector.  However, it  is  worth noting, that in  industry,  private sector  employment
declined by 5.3  percent, a percentage similar  to the  decline in  the public sector
(-6.7 percent).  This points to the fact that the recession in the industrial
sector is affecting also the private sector,  which is  not absorbing workers from
the public sector  in industry.
24.  Although growth in this sector has been buoyant, at present it's impact on
aggregate  employment developments is  necessarily small.  However, its importance
is likely to grow.  Given the sharp  decline in socialized sector employment, and
given prospects for further declines in the future, it appears that a buoyant
private  sector,  capable  of  absorbing  at  least  a  fraction  of  the  laid-off
workforce, will be key to dampening future increases in unemployment.
C. Wage Developments in 1990 and early 1991
25.  During 1990 average real  wages per  worker --wages deflated by the consumer
price index-- declined by 31 percent, which was exactly the ficure targeted by
the  Government program sponsored by the Stand-By agreement with the IMF.  The20
drop in real wages was much larger  than the drop in  productivity, thus resulting
in a significant redistribution of income away from labor.  However, given the
sharp increase in non-labor input costs, part of the wage adjustment worked to
cushion the increased costs of material inputs and the higher interest rates.
On the demand side, the drop in the "statistical" real wage may not reflect an
true economic decline in real wages, as 1989 was characterized by the presence
of widespread shortages.  For instance, if we measure wages in US dollars, and
use the free market  exchange rate as rough proxy of  shortages in the goods
markets, wages increased sionificantly during 1990.10 (Chart 4)
26.  Developments within  the year point to  the presence  of  two distinct
subperiods in wage behavior.  Real wages, after the  sharp fall  in January-
February,  began  to  recover  slowly  in  the  second  quarter  and  increased
significantly in  the third and  the fourth  quarter.  While reflecting the typical
seasonal pat4 !rn  of wage changes in Poland, "  this sharp distinction between the
behavior  in the first half and in the second half of the year  arose in the
context of a loosening of credit policy in the second half of the year.  This
association, however, does not implies any causality, as credit expansion might
have  simply  accommodated  rather  than  caused the  increase  in real  wages." 2
Moreover, evidence presented in  Charts 5a and 5b show that in the second half of
10  This  is obviously  an inadequate  indicator;  however,  in a context  characterized  by currency  convertibility  and even by the presence
of shops selling  goods in foreign  currency,  and by a stock  of household  deposits  in foreign  currency of more than five billion US S, such an
indicator  has some  value.
11 This seasonality  is due to the concentration  in the last months  of the year of extraordinary  payments,  particularly  to extraetion  and
energy sectors.
12  In addition,  the observationofoverall  bankcredit  -withoutdistinctionbetweengovernmentand  non-governmentsector,  and within
the non-government  sector  between  socialized  and non-socialized  sectors- may be an inadequate  indicator  of the available  finance  for socialized
enterprises,  especially  given  the presence  of a stock  of inter-enterprise  credit  larger than bank credit.21
Chart 4: Wages in US$ (*)
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Chart 5a: Poland
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1990 firms increased wages by reducing profits.  Given the large supply shock
which hit the enterprise sector at the beginning of the year and the consequent
need to reconstitute their liquidity  position, such  wage behavior  might have had
detrimental  effects  on  output  in  the  second  half  of  1990,  effectively
constraining the recovery.
The behavior  of  wages during  the year  does  not seem  to  resemble the
behavior predicted by the literature on labor-managed firms, whereby workers
maximize the wage rate and do not care about employment.  The sharp decline in
statistical real wages at the beginning of the program, and, more importantly,
the fact the wages increased in the first half of 1990 well below the ceilings,
point to the presence of downward flexibility of real wages.  In addition, the
sluggish adjustment of employment points to a large  weight attributed by workers
to the maintenance of employment.  This seems rational since when fi:ed workers
do not loose simply their wage but also their claim on the quasi-rents of the
firm and their de facto control of the enterprise assets.  When faced with some
probability of bankruptcy of the enterprise, and the attendant loss of control
over the firr, workers seem  to be willing to accept large  wage cuts.  In a sense
the firm borrows from its workers  (see  Calvo and Coricelli  (1991)).  When the
situation of  enterprises improved in  the second  half of 1990,  firms  paid back the
"loans" received in the first half.  The wage policy, based on a cumulative
ceiling, permitted  firms to carry out the operation without incurring in tax
penalties.  Overall,  the  wage-employment  behavior  observed  in Poland  after
January  1990  seems to  accord  with  the maximization  of expected  utility  of
representative  workers,  combined  with  a  "sharing rule"  based  on  the  full
appropriation by the workers of the quasi-rents of the firms (see Commander,
Coricelli and Staehr (1991)  for a  model along these lines).  This type of model25
illustrates both the concern of workers with employment and the institutional
setting allowing workers to appropriate all the profits of the enterprises.
The wage policy, by centering on the control of the wage bill, might have
allowed the increase in the wage rate through a decline in employment.
D.  The role of the wage policy
27.  The role played by the wage policy is not easy to interpret.  Indeed, in
the first six months of the year wage policy was not binding, with actual wage
increases consistently below the wage ceilings.  During the rest of the year,
wage  increases were consistently above the monthly  norm, as  firms gradually
depleted the accumulated unused norm.  Although for the year as a whole wage
behavior was roughly consistent with the wage po'licy,  and although the decline
of real wages  of  31 percent was  exactly the one  assumed  in the government
program, wage increases in the second half of 1990 likely contributed to the
persistence of inflation.  In particular, it appears that in the second half of
1990, wage policy served as a "floor" rather than a ceiling for wage increases,
with undesirable  effects on inflationary inertia.  This is  partly  confirmed by the
fact  that wage increases  in the second half  of the year took  place in  the context
of significant decline of profitability in  tha socialized sector. (Blanchard  and
Layard (1991)  point to the  presence of wage pressure in  the second half  of 1990)
28.  Charts 6a and 6b illustrate the existence of a clear distinction between
the first and the second half of 1990 as regards wage behavior, and show that
wages did not function as a "nominal anchor" for most of 1990 (except during
November and December 1990,  when the norm  was surpassed  in  the aggregate and thus
a relevant amount of excessive wage taxes were paid to the Treasury).  The fact26
Chart 6a: Wage policy In 1990
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that firms were willing to pay  high taxes (at rates well above 100 percent) on
excess wage increases is not easy to rationalize.  One possible explanation is
that monopolistic sectors were able to pass both the increase in wages and the
taxes  paid to the Treasury through  to higher  prices.  Another explanation is  that
firms were "testing" the government,  in particular its commitment to enforce
"hard budget constraints."
E.  Sectoral behavior of wages and employment
29.  Total employment in  the socialized sector fell  by approximately 8% between
December,  1989 and December, 1990.  Tl.e  employment decline in the socialized
industrial sector was substantially larger, about 14% (13%  between January and
December, 1990), representing a los  of approximately 550,000 industrial jobs.
As Table 3 reveals, employment fell in all industrial sectors, reflecting an
equally  widespread  drop  in  production.  However,  there  was  substantial
heterogeneity as regards the magnitudes and patterns of employment and output
decline.
30.  Employment in socialized industry continued to fall in the first half of
1991.  As of May 1991, employment had dropped by -1.6% relative to December 1990
levels.  Compared to the level for the same period of the previous year --  ie.
relative to Jan-May 1990 --  employment had fallen by as much as 7.2%."
31.  Table  3 shows that  the largest drops  in employment occurred  in light
industry, where employment fell  by -19% between December 1989  and December 1990,
13  The difference  between  the two figures  reflects  the difference  between  using end-of-period  figures  as the relevant  comparators
versus using period  averages.  Using the latter tends  to smooth  out the changes.TABLE  3
SECTORAL  DISTRIBUTION  OF EMPLOYMENT  AND  PRODUCTION  IN SOCIALIZED  INDUSTRY
SHARE  OF SECTOR  IN TOTAL  % CHANGE  DEC-40 TO DEC-00  a)  % CHANGE  DEC-0  TO MAY-41 c)
(osof  Jan'40)~  ~  ~  ~  ~  PP0UTONb  PWUTONb emWYMENr  P'ROODU'CTkN  EMPLOYMENT  )  mpLOYMENU
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  -14.1  -24.0  -1.0  -23.2
EXTRACTION  14.3  7.9  -13.4  -24.3  -4.1  -10.3
MANUFACTURING  85.7  92.1  -14.2  -23.9  -1.2  -24.0
FUELS& ENERGY  16.8  18.4  -11.4  -25.8  -2.7  -19.2
METALLURGY  5.2  19.3  -7.6  -16.3  -2.7  -13.2
ELECTROMACHINERY  31.7  20.6  -16.2  -29.6  -1.4  -38.4 CHEMICAL  6.7  10.0  -10.8  -25.6  -0.4  -27.9
MINERAL  5.1  3.8  -10.5  -20.1  1.0  -8.7
WOOD  & PAPER  6.0  4.6  -15.2  -17.4  5.3  -19.6
UGHT  15.7  7.8  -19.2  -35.2  -3.1  -27.1
TEXTILES  . 8.1  4.9  -20.9  -36.7  -5.4  -25.2
FOOD PROCESSING  10.4  14.0  -5.1  -9.0  -2.0  -13.3
SOURCE:  INFORMACJA  STATYSTYCZNA  VARIOUS  ISSUES
a) Relativ to Dec 1989  lleb
b) Delated by Index  of Prices  of Productlon  Sold
C)  R.Itlve  to Dec 1990  lvelI30
and in electromachinery, where employment fell by -16% during the same period.
In both of these  industries, the declines  seem to reflect substantial labor
shedding  in  response  to  sharp  drops  in  production  (of  -35%  and  -30%
respectively).  These two sectors have also been hard hit in 1991: as of May
1991, production in electromachinery was down by an astounding -38% relative to
December  1990 levels, whereas  in light industry  it was  down  by -27%.  The
corresponding declines in  employment have been relatively  moderate: of -1.4% for
electromachinery and of -5.4% for light industry.
32.  Table 4 presents changes in  the main economic variables by sector, for  the
year as a whole (ie.  average Jan-Dec 1990 relative to Jan-Dec 1989).  The year-
to-year comparison yields the same pattern of changes as did the December to
December comparison of Table 3.  The table shows that employment and production
declined  in  all  sectors,  with  employment  falling  significantly  less  than
production, so that  output per worker dropped across the board.  The hardest-hit
sectors were textiles, wearing apparel and leather goods (light industry), with
output  falling  by  30-40%  and  employment  falling  by  10-12%.  Some  of  the
engineering  sectors  --  namely  metal  products  and  transport  equipment  --  also
experienced large drops in employment and output.
33.  Declining sectoral  employment is  only part of the labor  market response to
declining production, the other part being the adjustment in wages.  As Table
4 shows,  the heterogeneity in  output performance across sectors  was also clearly
reflected  in the very disparate patterns of sectoral wage behavior.  Indeed,
while some sectors (extraction,  energy and metallurgy) paid wages consistently
above the norm, the manufacturing sectors hardest hit by the contraction ofTable 4:
Poland: Sectoral  Data, 1990
Jan-Dec 89s  100
Producer  Rel  Product  Consumer  Nominal
Employment  ProductIty  Production  Prices  Proilts  wage  wagse  wages
COAL  91.10  78.00  71680  1.078.3  42.1  40.8  63.4  441.3
FUEL  097.0  78.74  78.50  1.190.8  168.1  52.0  75.8  527.9
POWER  101.80  88.41  90.00  1.272.1  313.8  44.9  68.7  478.1
FERROUS  METALLURGY  94.40  88.03  83.10  1,098.1  117.9  55.2  74.7  5196
NON-FERROUS  METALLURG  97.20  78.50  76.30  1.090.6  113.7  51.3  72.9  507.6
METAL  PRODUCTS  90.60  79.25  71.80  836.5  75.6  64.3  67.5  470.0
ENGINEERING  89.20  90.36  80.60  781.8  74.2  69.4  68.5  476.7
PRECISION  INSTRUMENTS  89.70  92.75  83.20  650.1  o0.8  80.9  65.7  457.1
TRANSPORT  EQUIPMENT  91.50  80.77  73.90  sss.C  70.4  63.8  68.7  477.9
EL-TECH  ENG.  & ELECTRONI  92.00  85.54  78.70  734.6  57.4  70.9  65.5  4560.0
CHEMICAL  INDUSTRY  93.90  80.19  75.30  938.9  80.6  59.1  68.2  474 7
BUILDING  MATERIALS  93.20  82.40  76.80  892.1  91.9  60.6  67.6  470.8
GLASS  & GLASS  PRODUCTS  94.00  76.53  72.40  873.0  68.3  62.6  67.0  46.2
POTTERY  a CHINA  97.00  76.39  74.10  734.1  61.7  72.4  66.8  465.0
WOOD  & WOOD  PRODUCTS  89.80  84.19  75.60  730.7  35.4  73.9  66.0  459.6
PAPER  A  PAPER  PRODUCTS  92.30  83.75  77.30  949.8  70.6  58.8  67.7  471.1
TEXTILE  PRODUCTS  88.90  66.93  69.50  638.1  21.3  78.0  61.8  429.8
WEARING  APPAREL  89.20  77.80  69.40  496.8  27.4  97.7  62.1  431.0
LEATHER  PRODUCTS  90.10  73.68  86.30  605.3  17.  84.6  60.3  419.8
FOOD  INDUSTRY  98.20  756.6  74.30  727.6  52.0  82.2  e6.0  459.2
Unwelghted  averages  93.26  80.89  75.44  858.2  80.0  66.5  67.2  468.0
Std. devletion  3.70  6.03  6.33  204.62  83.98  13.44  3.85  20.82
Cooll.  of variation,  in %  3.96  7.45  8.39  23.84  79.94  20.21  6.73  5.73
11  Due to unavailability  ot dala on producer  prices by sectors  for December  1990,
the product wage  relers to January-November.32
output,  namely  light  industry  and electromachinery,  stayed within  the  norm
throughout the year.
34.  The  data  indicate  that  wage  growth  was  strongly  correlated  with
profitability across sectors.  The evidence also shows that capital intensive
sectors  increased  wages  more  than  labor  intensive  sectors,  a  phenomenon
consistent with theories of wage bargaining in imperfectly competitive labor
markets.  These stylized facts suggest  that  wage growth was clearly linked  to the
ability to pay out of profits: sectors with lower profitability  --due to more
intense import competition, lower ability to raise prices, or inherently lower
capital/labor ratios-- increased their wages less.
35.  Despite the sectoral heterogeneity, Table 4 suggests some convergence in
the  nominal  wage  level  across  manufacturing  sectors  by  the  end  of  1990.
Moreover, it is apparent that the variability across sectors in the increase in
nominal wages was much smaller than the variability of other sectoral variables,
such as prices, output and profits (Table  4).  Thus, despite experiencing lower
absolute wage  growth,  light industry and electromachinery may  have actually
improved  their relative  wage  position.  This apparent  convergence in  wage levels,
which occurred daspite widely varying output and financial performances, raises
some questions regarding wage "leadership"  and relative wage dynamics.  Sectors
with better financial conditions --and not necessarily higher efficiency-- may
have served  as  wage "leaders,"  with imitation  effects in  less  profItable sectors.
These  wage-wage  dynamics  could  have  adverse  inflationary  consequences.
Furthermore, the inflationary implications of this transmission mechanism would
be strengthened by the fact that wages in the budgetary sphere are indexed to33
wages in the socialized sector.
36.  Table 4 shows that the variance of wages across sectors --as measured by
the  coefficient  of  variation--  was  much  greater  than  that  of  employment,
suggesting that employment  was  more "rigid"  than  w.ages  during 1990.  However, the
patterns for the year as a whole are somewhat deceptive.  During the first  part
of the year, wages were  in fact fairly flexible, and fell substantially  in
response to the initial drop in production.  However, during the second half of
the year, the adjustment patterns reversed: real wages grew substantially even
though employment continued to  decline. At the scLme  time,  production stabilized.
In some sense, during the latter part of the year, wages were quite "rigid" in
their unresponsiveness to rising unemployment.  This latter pattern seems to
reflect the combined effects of sluggishness in  the employment response with the
inertial force of the wage policy.
37.  Table 5  presents changes in  the main economic variables by sector for Jan-
Jun 1991  relative to Jan-Jun 1990. The table brings  out a few interesting facts:
(a)  production has fallen in the first half of 1991, even relative to the first
half of 1990, which was itself characterized by a sharp drop in production; (b)
employment has fallen during the first half of 1991, at approximately the same
rate as production; (c)  the decline in  productivity has slowed  down, and in some
sectors, productivity  (in terms of output per worker) has increased;  (c) the
variance in the performance of real  variables --  employment and output --  across
sectors has increased, while the variance in  prices and wages has decreased; (d)
product wages in all sectors --even in those doing particularly poorly-- are up
significantly relative to 1990, and real profits are down.Table  6:
Poland: Sectoral  Data. 1991
Jan-Jun 90o 100
.. ::..Reil . . Producet.:  Real  Product  Consunme  . nlr  W
________________  Emjb;iinent  .Praducvlty  Production  Pricec  ProIts  wge  wg  wages
TOTAL  92.8  97.6  90.6  162.2  33.  123.7  105.7  188.2
MINING  19.5  111.2  99.5  185.3  23.2  109.2  113.6  202.4
MANUFACTURING  93.2  96.6  90  149.7  35.0  124.0  104.2  185.6
COAL  89.20  116.00  103.50  208.8  674.5  99.9  117.1  208.5
FUEL  06.e0  67.60  s6.40  175.8  13.9  127.7  126.1  224.5
POWER  101.00  95.40  96.40  181.0  -7.5  107.0  109.2  194.4
FERROUS  METALLURGY  93.20  U8.30  82.30  118.5  19.5  158.3  105.3  187.6
NON-FERROUS  METALLURG  91.50  93.00  95.10  123.8  31.1  127.5  88.7  157.9
METAL  PRODUCTS  97.50  98.40  95.90  134.1  42.2  134.5  101.2  180.3
ENGINEERING  39.50  89.10  79.70  144.0  40.4  121.0  97.9  174.3
PRECISION  INSTRUMENTS  85.80  96.60  82.90  123.2  32.5  144.9  100.2  178.5
TRANSPORT  EOUIPMENT  91.30  7480  68.30  176.9  18.8  99.4  98.8  175.9
EL-TECH ENG.  & ELECTRONI  84.60  99.50  84.10  132.3  30.0  137.7  102.3  182.2
CHEMICAL  INDUSTRY  94.50  97.80  92.40  145.7  47.4  125.5  102.7  182.9
BUILDING  MATERIALS  99.00  97.40  96.40  136.3  42.7  142.6  109.1  194.3
GLASS& GLASS  PRODUCTS  96.50  102.10  98.50  139.2  46.4  125.5  98.1  174.7
POTTERY  &  CHINA  93.90  100.90  94.70  154.2  52.7  108.3  93.3  167.0
WOODbIWOODPRODUCTS  104.90  100.10  105.00  162.6  55.6  112.6  102.8  183.0
PAPER  &  PAPER  PRODUCTS  93.20  112.30  104.7  116.7  10.0  164.7  107.9  192.2
TEXTILE  PRODUCTS  80.40  109.50  88  134.3  14.4  130.7  98.5  175.5
WEARING  APPAREL  98.20  101.00  99.2  158.6  37.0  122.3  108.9  193.9
LEATHER  PRODUCTS  87.40  96.10  84.00  154.3  8.9  125.0  108.3  192.9
FOODINDUSTRY  104.10  100.40  104.50  161.5  81.1  122.0  110.6  197.0
Unweighted  averages  (mfg)  93.71  97.82  91.60  149.12  65.03  128.88  104.37  185.88 Std.  devation  6.30  8.84  9.70  23.35  141.14  16.87  ao9  14.40
Coeff. of vaiation, In *  6.73  9.04  10.59  15.66  217.03  13.30  7.75  7.75
11  Far  l-V, 1991.35
38.  If 1990 was characterized by a generalized contraction in output, 1991
appears to reflect more of the same.  Among the main factors behind the output
decline in 1991 are the demise of the CMEA trade--which implied  a large terms of
trade shock as Poland is now importing key raw materials from the Soviet Union
at world prices, and a large drop in demand especially from the Soviet Union--
and the increased import competition associated with the appreciation of the
exchange rate. The latter  not only impacts  output  directly by reducing demand for
the domestic good, but also acts to constrain price increases in the import-
competing sectors, which in turn may have an indirect effect on output through
a cost-price squeeze.  Table 6 presents some very  Dreliminary evidence on this
point.
39.  As noted abo.~e,  light industry and electromachinery were the two sectors
that were hit the hardest by the contraction in output in both 1990 and 1991.
These two sectors were also the most open to import competition --  in 1990, the
import  penetration  ratio  for  electromachinery  was  the  highest  for  all  of
manufacturing, at 25%, while that for light industry was the second highest, at
18%.  Furthermore, these two sectors experienced remarkably large increases in
their import penetration ratios between 1990 and 1991:14  the import penetration
ratio for  electromachinery increased from  25% in  1990  to 37.6% in  1991,  while the
comparable ratio for light industry increased from 18% to 26%.  While far from
providing conclusive evidence, these patterns suggest a likely link between
14 Note that light  industry  may have  been exposed  to 'effective' foreign  conpetition faster  than the other ectors because  the time  to
create effective  channels  of imports  and exports is usually  shorter  for sectors  producing  final consumer  goodsTable  6:
Poland:  Secloral  Data.  1991
Jan-Jun 90 = 100
Real  Real  X Share  X Share  M Share  M Share  X Share  M Share
Employment  Productlon  Profits  11  - 90  91  90  91  91-90  91-90
TOTAL  92.8  90.6  33.8  0.31  0.27  0.16  0.25  -3.96  9.68
MINING  89.5  99.5  23.2
MANUFACTURING  93.2  90  35.0
COAL  89.20  103.50  674.5  0.18  0.13  0.13  0.23  -5.10  9.92
FUEL  98.60  86.40  13.9  0.18  0.13  0.13  0.23  -5.10  9.92
POWER  101.00  96.40  -7.5  0.18  0.13  0.13  0.23  -5.10  9.92
FERROUS  METALLURGY  93.20  82.30  19.5  0.25  0.40  0.08  0.12  15.13  4.22
NON-FERROUS  METALLURG  91.50  85.10  31.1  0.25  0.40  0.08  0.12  15.13  4.22
METAL  PRODUCTS  97.50  95.90  42.2  0.40  0.33  0.25  0.38  -7.59  12.52
ENGINEERING  89.50  79.70  40.4  0.40  0.33  0.25  0.38  -7.59  12.52
PRECISION  INSTRUMENTS  85.80  82.90  32.5  0.40  0.33  0.25  0.38  -7.59  12.b2
TRANSPORT  EQUIPMENT  91.30  68.30  18.8  0.40  0.33  0.25  0.38  -7.59  12.52
EL-TECH  ENG.  & ELECTRONI  84.50  84.10  30.0  0.40  0.33  0.25  0.38  -7.59  12.52
CHEMICAL  INDUSTRY  94.50  92.40  47.4  0.41  0.34  0.18  0.30  -6.27  12.12
BUILDING  MATERIALS  99.00  96.40  42.7  0.14  0.17  0.07  0.14  2.76  7.17
GLASS&  GLASS  PRODUCTS  96.50  98.50  46.4  0.14  0.17  0.07  0.14  2.76  7.17
POTTERY  & CHINA  93.90  94.70  52.7  0.14  0.17  0.07  0.14  2.76  7.17
WOOD  &WOOD  PRODUCTS  104.90  105.00  55.5  0.30  0.30  0.07  0.13  -0.17  5.75
PAPER  &PAPER  PRODUCTS  93.20  104.7  19.0  0.30  0.30  0.07  0.13  -0.17  5.75
TEXTILE  PRODUCTS  80.40  88  14.4  0.26  0.24  0.18  0.26  -2.44  7.91
WEARING  APPAREL  98.20  99.2  37.0  0.26  0.24  0.18  0.26  -2.44  7.91
LEATHER  PRODUCTS  87.40  84.00  8.9  0.26  0.24  0.18  0.26  -2.44  7.91
FOODINDUSTRY  104.10  104.50  81.1  0.20  0.i3  0.08  0.15  -6.17  7.29
Unwelghted  averages  (m?g)  93.71  91.60  65.03  0.27  0.26  0.15  0.24  -1.74  8.85
Std.  deviation  6.30  9.70  141.14  0.10  0.09  0.07  0.10  6.64  2.80
Coefl.  of  variation.  In  %  6.73  10.59  217.03  35.62  35.55  49.13  41.39  -381.30  31.6837
increased import competition in a sector and output decline." 5
Interestingly,  the  relatively  good  performance  of food-processing  industries  -ame
together with an increase in tariffs on imports of food products.
40.  Strong import competition may have also acted to  limit the ability of
import-competing firms to increase prices (moderating their degree of monopoly
power)" 6, reducing profitability and forcing firms to lay off workers.
Tables 4 and 5 appear to support this view by presenting a strong correlation
between profitability, price increases and employment across sectcrs.
IV.  Prospects and Policies for 1991
A. Unemployment
41.  The key issue for  unemployment  developments in  1991 is  that  they are likely
to be driven by the need to adjust to past drops in  production.  As noted above,
the data suggest that employment adjustment is extremely sluggish (see  Chart 3,
Tables 3 and 4), so that much o- the employment response to the dramatic 1990
fall in output was expected to happen in 1991, or even 1992.  The additional
contraction in output now projected for 1991 suggests that unemployment will
continue  to increase even beyond 1991.  Furthermore,  widespread restructuring of
the  economy  (with  firms  and  entire  sectors  closing  down)  and  substantial
IS A simple  cross-sector  regression  of Change  in Log(Output)  on Change  in Log(Product  Wage),  Change  in Log(Productivity),  Change
in the Export Share and Change in the Import Share yields a coefficient  on the import share of -2.5 (S.E. =  1.00).  This implies that a I
percentage  point increase  in the import  share  decreases  output  by 2.5 %.
16 State-owned  firms in these sectors might  have  also experienced  more intense  competition  from domestic  producers  in the private
sector  than firms  in sectors  with higher  barriers to entry.38
privatization  could  raise  the  number  of  unemployed  even  further,  albeit
temporarilv.
42.  The  RelationshiD  Between  Emplovment  and  Outi,ut:  Our  expectations  for
further  increases  in  unemployment  in  1991  were  predicated  on  the  assumption  of
sluggish  employment  adjustment,  an  assumption  supported  by  informal  analysis  of
the  raw  data.  To  gain  some  insight  as  to  the  relation  between  employment  and
output  in  Polish  industry,  we  ran  a  simple  regression  of  year-to-year  changes  in
aggregate  employment  on  current  and  lagged  year-to-year  changes  in  aggregate
production  using  monthly  data  for  the  1987-90  period.  This  yielded  an  aggregate
elasticity  of  employment  with  respect  to  output  significantly  smaller  than  1:  the
sum  of  the  coefficients  on  current  and  lagged  changes  in  output  was  .50
(SE=.072),  suggesting  very  slow  employment  adjustment.
43.  Based  on  these  estimates,  and  assuming  no  major  structural  breaks  in  the
relation  between  output  and  employment  in  the  socialized  sector,  we  infer  a  lower
bound  for  unemployment  in  1991.'7  On  the  assumption  of  "zero"  growth  of  the
socialized  sector  during  1991,  we  estimated  that  unemployment  would  increase  to
an  average  of  1.5  million  throughout  1991,  reaching  a  level  of  about  2.0  million
by  December.  This  would  reflect  primarily  a  10%  drop  in  socialized  sector
employment,  representing  lagged  employment  adjustment  to  last  year's  drop  in
production.  In  fact,  as  revealed  by  Table  5,  projections  of  zero  growth  for  the
year  turned  out  to  be  too  optimistic.
17  While  relying  on historical  patterns  may  be somewhat  risky  given  the  magnitude  of  the  changes  undeiway  in  the  Polist  economy,
we believe  that  some  basic  patterns  can  be inferred  from  the most  recent  period. In fact,  the experience  of 1990  suggest  that in  the absence
of widespread  privatization,  the  behavior  of economic  agents  in  the socialized  sector  is  unlikely  to depart  dramatica!ly  from  that  observed  in  the
last  two  years.39
B.  Wage Policy in 1991
44.  The  new wage policy for 1991  --to be reviewed in  July-- modifies in  several
respects the wage policy in force in 1990.  Overall,  it is still a  monthly
indexation scheme, to  be enforced  through tax  penalties.  Every  month the Council
of Ministers will decide on the monthly indexation coefficient: for January the
coefficient was 0.6.  In  addition to the indexation component, average wages can
be increased without  Incurring in tax penalties under several cases.  "I This
makes the  policy very complex and  easily circumvented.  The  main differences with
respect to 1990 are:
(1) the  average  wage  rather  than  the  wage  bill  is  subject  to
ceilings;
(2)  so-called "commercialized" firms (firms  which become joint-stock
companies and will be privatized) are entitled to exemptions from
the tax penalties --to varying degrees depending on the proportion
of shares retained by the Treasury;
(3) permitted wage increases are linked to firm-level performance.
45.  Point (1)  is  a welcome change as it  eliminates the "pro-unemployment"  bias
of the wage-bill control  of 1990.  In  terms of  efficiency, the control of average
wage could in principle have the undesired effect of stimulating the firing of
better paid workers (supposedly  better skilled).  On the other hand, it has the
Is  First,  firms which increased wages above the ceiling during  1990 have a proportionally higher ceiling in  1991; second,  firms
which increased wages below the norm in  1990, can pay the unused norm in 1991; finally, as noted below, firms can increase  wages as long
as  their ratio of profits to wages does not decline with respect to  1990.40
advantage of not limiting a firm's  ability to expand and hire more workers if it
is profitable (which was a problem with the control of the wage bill).
46.  Point (2) is controversial.  Indeed, this measure accords with the view
that wage controls are necessary in the context of state-owned enterprises in
which there is no "advocate for capital" (see  Hinds (1990)),  but not in private
enterprises.  However,  even accepting  this argument,  in the  short-run  this
different treatment may yield undesirable effects.  One should keep in  mind that
wage policy serves  as an  anti-inflationary tool.  It  has inevitably  distortionary
effects.  Exempting,  even partially  commercialized firms  would permit higher  wage
increases in these firms with a direct inflationary effect.  Moreover,  it is
likely to generate wage pressures  in the socialized sector as "imitation" or
"relative  wage" considerations drive  wage demands in  those sectors.  Finally, in
the very short-run, it is not clear that the incentives of commercialized firms
will differ from those of state enterprises and thus higher wages can simply
result in the "decapitalization" of enterprises.  The extremely long list of
application for "commercialization" by many enterprises controlled by "workers
councils"  suggest that  this measure  may  serve  in the  short-run  as  a mere
instrument for wage increases.
47.  Point (3) introduces an extremely negative mechanism.  The profit ratio
selected  is  defined  as:  (nominal profits  +  wages(without  bonuses))/wages
(without  bonuses).  This ratio can increase for two reasons: first in the case
of an increase in productivity, second in the case of an increase in prices.
Firms with monopoly power can thus transfer to prices the increase in wages. In
addition, capital-intensive firms can share with the workers the "quasi-rents"41
due  to  higher  capital-labor  ratio  with  smaller  effects  on  profit  ratios." 9 This
rule,  therefore,  seems  particularly  undesirable.  The  fact  that  the  wage  law
excludes  monopolies  from  this  rule  is  unlikely  to  be  effective  in  the  present
Polish  context.  Even  abstracting  from  the  above  effects,  these  firm-level
linkages  between  wages  and  profits  may  lead  to  the  same  drawbacks  discussed  with
respect  to  point  (2).  Namely,  if  the  objective  of  the  wage  policy  is  to
contribute  to  the  anti-inflation  policy,  firms  with  higher  productivity  should
increase  their  profits  and  their  competitiveness  and  not  transfer  it  to  the
workers.  The  aggregate  effect  would  be  lower  inflation  and  thus  higher  real
wages.  X
48.  For  1991,  on  the  basis  of  the  indexation  scheme  and  an  expected  price  path,
the  government  expected  an  increase  in  real  wages  of  3  percent  (average  1991  over
average  1990).  This  target  implies  a  reduction  of  about  10  percent  of  real  wages
during  the  year,  under  the  assumption  of  inflation  rates  around  1  percent  per
month  starting  in  March  1991.  With  inflation  rates  higher  than  anticipated,  the
implied  decline  of  real  wages  would  be  even  larger.  The  realism  of  this
assumption  is  highly  questionable.  In  particular,  the  inflation  path  assumed  by
the  government  assumes  that  the  wage  scheme  has  no  impact  on  that  inflation  path,
whereas  the  monthly  indexation  may  greatly  complicate  the  fast  reduction  of
inflation  rates.  Indeed,  the  monthly  adjustment  -- despite  indexation
coefficients  smaller  than  one--  is  likely  to  contribute  to  inflation  persistence,
particularly  following  the  significant  acceleration  of  inflation  occurring  at  the
19 While  empirical  eviden,  . suggests  that  this 'rent-sharing  is,  in  fact,  quite  prevalent  in market  economies,  it seems  undesirable  to
explicitly  'institutionalize'  or legislate  such  'rent-sharing'  in  the  absence  of well-defined  ownership  rights.
2m More  precisely,  the  reference  is an 'effectiveness'  index  given  by  the ratio  of profits  to wages(excluding  bonuses)  plus  profits.42
beginning  of  1991  in  connection  with  the  large  planned  increases  in
administrative prices. 21
49.  In  the context of increasing rates of inflation in January-February, wage
pressures  could  build  and  become  untenable.  Given  the  absence  of  market
restraints on  wage  behavior, wage policy  remains  an  important component  of
macroeconomic policy.  Indeed, in the absence of a wage policy contributing to
reduce inflationary inertia,  serious  problems in  managing macroeconomic policies
are  likely to  surface  in the next months.  In particular,  without  a  "wage
anchor",  the  "exchange  rate  anchor"  may be  unsustainable,  even  with  tight
monetary policies.
50.  This  suggests the  necessity of maintaining  some  form of wage  policy,
despite its clear distortionary effects.  However, the new policy introduced in
1991 seems to suffer from sorme  of the main limitations of the 1990 policy.  We
already noted that the  monthly indexation introduces  undesirable rigidities.  In
addition doubts can be raised on the implications of some of the modifications
introduced.
51.  Improvements could perhaps  be achieved by: (i)  lengthening the interval  of
wage indexation; (ii) simplifying the wage rules, avoiding clauses relating to
firm-level performance.  Some consideration could be given to a wage policy,
perhaps  based  on  an  agreement  among  relevant  parties  (trade  unions,
representative of  workers councils,  managers, farmers and  the government), which
21  The  announced  continuation  of tight macroeconomic  policies  will  certainly rule out an explosive  wage-price  spiral but, especially
in the context  of gtill widespread  cost-plus  pricing behavior,  will be unlikely effective  in bringing down rapidly inflation.  If effective, mnay  imply
large  coats  in terms  of real economic  activity.43
states a simple rule of wage increase for  the whole economy, linked to expected
inflation and expected real growth (in  the economy as a whole).  The rule could
be translated into wage changes at intervals of  six or three months, with the
additional  clause that  in case of substantial deviations between  actual and
expected inflation, adjustments will be made.
V.  Concluding remarks
52.  This note  has reviewed recent  labor market  developments  in Poland and
discussed  some  of  the  main  problems  that  Poland  faces  in  sustaining  the
stabilization effort.  The main findings are the following:
(i) The  large increase in unemployment during 1990 cannot be taken to
reflect widespread economic adjustment and restructuring throughout the Polish
economy. Contrary to predictions made prior to the January 1990 stabilization
program, employment has  declined nearly uniformly across all sectors, and  mainly
as a consequence of a generalized contraction in output rather than as a result
of  sectoral  restructuring  or massive  labor shedding.  In  fact, we  find no
evidence  of  substantial  restructuring  within  the  socialized  sector--  no
bankruptcies, no sectors closing down-- and find little evidence of a dramatic
shift in employment and wage behavior with respect to the past.=  This pattern
poses some serious problems for  the immediate future.  Clearly, there is a need
for  widespread restructuring of  the economy,  yet such  restructuring  may not  occur
in the absence large-scale privatization.  Furthermore, if it does occur in  the
22 This most likely  reflects the absence of significant change in the ownership and control stiuctures of socialized  enterprises.44
short term, without significant changes in the ownership structure the supply
response may be limited.  In  this context, restructuring would tend to boost the
already high levels of unemployment (by  Eastern European standards), increasing
them even further, and raising questions regarding the political sustainability
of the reform program.
(ii) As regards wages, they showed  a significant degree of downward flexibility
--in real terms-- at the beginning of the year when firms faced a severe supply
shock coupled with very tight credit conditions.  However, from March on, wages
began to increase faster  than  prices,  most likely contributing  to  the persistence
of inflation. In addition, the existing wage policy scheme proved itself to be
quite ineffective, if  not actually damaging.  The data show  that the wage policy
was never binding, except in November and December 1990.  In the first half of
the year wages were well below the ceilings, while  in the second they were
consistently above.  In  fact, one could argue  that in  the second  half of the year
wage  policy  served more as a "floor" for wage increases than as a constraint.
As  regards the future,  the  wage policy  mechanism was only  marginally modified for
1991 and since it is still based on a monthly indexation scheme, is likely to
impede a rapid decline in inflation in 1991.45
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